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Felton v. Douglas County, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 6 (Feb. 15, 2018)1 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CONCURRENT WAGES IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
CALCUATION 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined that when an uncompensated volunteer, who has concurrent private 
employment and is injured during the course of volunteer work, shall have their average monthly 
wage for the purposes of workers’ compensation benefits to be the aggregate of the “deemed wage” 
provided by statute along with their earnings from the concurrent private employment.  
 
Background 
 
 Gregory Felton suffered an injury while volunteering on the Douglas County Search and 
Rescue team. At the time of the injury Felton had concurrent private employment. Following the 
injury, Felton filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The claims adjustor calculated 
Felton’s benefits based on his average monthly wage, using only the statutorily deemed wage of a 
search and rescue volunteer.2 Felton sought review by an appeals officer, and argued that his 
deemed wage should be aggregated with his earned wage of his private employment. The appeals 
officer upheld the claim adjustor’s decision, and Felton sought review by the District Court. The 
District Court denied review, which was then appealed the Nevada Supreme Court. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The standard is that The Court applies a de novo standard of review to the administrative 
interpretation of statutes.3 The Court decides pure legal questions without deference to the 
agency’s determination, or the district court’s decision regarding the petition for review.4 
 
NRS 616A.065 provides a starting point for calculating Felton's AMW 
 
 The calculation of average monthly wage (AMW) is either the monthly wage earned or 
deemed earned by statute, or a maximum amount based on the average weekly wage earned in the 
state, whichever is lower. NRS 616A.065(1) states the average monthly wage shall be the “lesser 
of: (a) The monthly wage actually received or deemed to have been received …; or (b) One 
hundred fifty percent of the state average weekly wage . . .”5 The reviewing appeals officer, in 
upholding the decision that Felton’s average monthly wage was only his deemed wage, found that 
wage to be the “lesser of: (a) the monthly wage actually received or deemed to have been 
received.”6 The Court found that the appeals officer misread NRS 616A.065 when they claimed 
that “lesser of” applied to the “or” contained within NRS 616A.065(1)(a). Instead, the “lesser of” 
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applies to the “or” between subsection (1)(a) and (1)(b), meaning the “lessor of: (a) The monthly 
wage …; or (b) One hundred fifty percent. . .” 7 Thus, the Court found the calculation of average 
monthly wage to be the wages earned or deemed earned, provided that this does not exceed the 
maximum based on the average weekly wage in 1(b). 
 The Court then looked at the “or” in subsection (1)(a), stating the statute clearly indicates 
either deemed wages or actual wages are properly included in an average monthly wage 
determination, but the statute is not clear whether concurrent employment was included. When the 
statute does not address an issue, the Court may look outside the statutory language to determine 
the Legislature’s intent regarding the issue.8 The Court found NRS 616C.420 and NAC 616C.447, 
its corresponding regulation, to be helpful, as it requires regulations be made to provide “a method 
of determining average monthly wage,” and the regulation addresses concurrent employment.9 
 
NAC 616C.447 requires that Felton's AMW be calculated by aggregating his private wage with 
his deemed wage for volunteer work 
 
 The Court found that the plain language of NAC 616C.447 requires the aggregation of 
wages for concurrent employment and does not bar the aggregation of different categories of 
wages.10 The regulation provides that the “average monthly wage of an employee who is employed 
by two or more employers … on the date of a disabling accident or disease is equal to the sum of 
the wages earned or deemed to have been earned at each place of employment.”11 The appeals 
officer attempted to distinguish NAC 616C.447 by citing Meridian Gold Co. v. State ex rel. 
Department of Taxation, stating that when an administrative regulation conflicts, expands, or 
modifies a governing statute, then the regulations will be deemed invalid.12 However, the Court 
rejected this argument, and instead construed the related provision in harmony to keep the 
provisions in effect.13 The two provisions provide context to each other; NRS 616A.065 provides 
the definition of an average monthly wage, and NAC 616C.447 provides how concurrent 
employment applies to that definition.14 Therefore, NAC 616C.447 applies to Felton’s workers’ 
compensation claim and his average monthly wage is calculated as the aggregation of his deemed 
wage for being a volunteer and his concurrent private earned wage, subject to the maximum set 
forth in NRS 616A.065(1)(b). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court remanded the matter to recalculate Felton’s benefits accordingly. 
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